Arbitration Agreements In Health Care: Myths and Reality by Rolph, Elizabeth et al.
ROLPH.FMT 04/01/98 8:11 AM
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN
HEALTH CARE: MYTHS AND REALITY
ELIZABETH ROLPH,* ERIK MOLLER** AND JOHN E. ROLPH***
I
INTRODUCTION
You won’t learn much new about arbitration agreements from a survey of health care
providers.  They all use ‘em.
This comment, offered by one well-positioned respondent to the study on
which this article is based, reflects the widespread belief that alternative dispute
resolution methods, particularly mandatory binding arbitration agreements,
have become the rule in health care delivery.1  This apparent trend has spurred
vigorous debate about the merits of using such agreements.  Our study is an
effort to ascertain how widespread mandatory arbitration agreements between
health plans and providers and their enrollees and patients really are, to assess
how decisions regarding their use are made, and to evaluate the prospects of
their future use.  We found, contrary to popular belief, that arbitration
agreements are not used widely in the medical setting, and, where they are
used, it is typically because organizational policy explicitly directs their use.
A.    Background
Dispute resolution in the context of health care delivery has been seen as a
pressing problem for a number of years.2  Traditionally, health care disputes
centered on the medical malpractice issue of whether a medical provider’s
services met the legal standard of care.  Unexpected and dramatic growth in
claims during the 1970s led to a rapid growth in physician malpractice insurance
premiums, in some cases sufficient to threaten the continuing availability of
valued specialty services (for example, obstetrical services in some states).
These dynamics, in turn, engendered a wave of state reforms, including the
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1. See Barry Meier, In Fine Print, Customers Lose Ability to Sue,  N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1997, at
A1.
2. For extensive discussions of the “medical malpractice crisis,” evidence regarding litigation
costs, and the probable effects of the many tort reform proposals on claiming, transaction costs, and
awards, see generally PATRICIA DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND
PUBLIC POLICY (1985); PAUL WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL (1991).
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introduction of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, general damage
caps, regulation of attorneys’ fees, and no-fault systems for a few specific
injuries such as children’s vaccines and prenatal injuries.3
With the growth of managed care, the potential for disputes has increased
substantially.  As plans and providers attempt to contain costs by limiting
unnecessary care, they pave the way for a whole new class of disputes over
coverage.  In addition, managed care is giving rise to a proliferation of
treatment decisionmakers, thereby opening the door to further disputes over
who should be responsible for decisions regarding, for example, treatment
plans or denial of coverage.4  At the same time, in the new, more adversarial
environment of managed care, patients may well be more likely to challenge
the medical judgment and technical competence of providers.  Thus, the
problem of managing the dispute process efficiently, fairly, and in a manner
that leaves disputant relationships intact, becomes ever more pressing.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that doctors, hospitals, and health plans, in an
effort to find more efficient, more predictable, and arguably less threatening
mechanisms for dispute resolution in this new environment, are following the
lead of certain other industries, such as banking, real estate, securities, and
employment, by increasingly requiring plan enrollees and patients to agree in
advance to binding arbitration of any disputes.5
It is worth noting that there are important differences between these
mandatory, binding arbitration agreements and other forms of arbitration used
to resolve disputes.  Arbitration is an adjudicative process that takes place
outside the court and uses independent neutrals to hear the evidence and
render judgments.  Parties can come to arbitration as a result of court rules or a
contractual agreement to arbitrate.  Contractual agreements to arbitrate
include voluntary post-dispute agreements, pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate
that are not a precondition of the business relationship, and mandatory pre-
dispute agreements that are a precondition of the business relationship.
Arbitrations can be nonbinding, allowing a dissatisfied party the right to take
the dispute to the courts for another hearing, or binding, with no right of
appeal.
Arbitration agreements emerging in the delivery of health care are
mandatory and binding.  They take the form of language embedded in health
plan contracts with purchasers and enrollees, and of specific contracts
presented to patients by hospitals and physicians at the outset of the
relationship.6  Such agreements stipulate that all future disputes between the
                                                          
3. For an excellent summary of specific tort reforms that have been enacted, and empirical
evidence regarding their effects, see WEILER, supra note 2.
4. See HEALTH CARE DELIVERY AND TORT: SYSTEMS ON A COLLISION COURSE, 21-23
(Elizabeth Rolph, ed., 1992).
5. See generally Meier, supra note 1; William Sage, Health Law 2000, The Legal System and the
Changing Health Care Market, 15:3 HEALTH AFF. 1 at 14-15 (1996).
6. Binding arbitration agreements may also govern resolution of disputes among business entities
(plans and providers; employers and employees; buyers and vendors), as well as between patients and
business entities.  However, equity and consumer protection concerns are most salient when patients
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parties to the agreement must be resolved through binding arbitration, while
providing a broad definition of the rules governing the procedure.  Parties to
such agreements unequivocally waive their rights to trial or judicial oversight of
their disputes.
As mandatory binding arbitration agreements are perceived to be more
prevalent in health care delivery, the debate over the consequences of their use
grows.  Proponents of these agreements maintain, as they have for some years,
that arbitration is preferable to the courts as a vehicle for resolving disputes for
a number of reasons,7 including the following:
1. Efficiency.  Arbitrations, they argue, require less discovery than court
proceedings, are typically much less formal in their evidentiary demands, and
generally require substantially less hearing time.  Thus, arbitrated disputes will
cost less to pursue and will reach resolution faster.
2. Informed, Consistent Decisionmaking.  Bolstered by well-publicized and
arguably unfounded large malpractice and coverage verdicts, proponents assert
that judges and juries lack the necessary expertise and objectivity to render fair
judgments in complex and often emotionally charged medical cases.  They
argue that justice is better served when informed, objective arbitrators sit in
judgment.
3. Maintenance of Important Relationships.  Proponents also assert that the
private, arguably less adversarial arbitration proceeding enhances the
possibility of continuing positive relationships among patients, plans, and
providers.  They suggest that this attribute is a particularly important feature in
the case of health care disputes where a claimant’s well-being may depend on
continuity of care.
4. Claimant Satisfaction.  Proponents contend, because a dispute is more
likely to go to a hearing if it is an arbitration case, claimants are more likely to
have the satisfaction of a “day in court” under an arbitration agreement.  Thus,
arbitration better meets the psychological needs of claimants.8
5. Confidentiality.  Providers, particularly physicians, welcome the
confidentiality of the private arbitration forum.  Allegations of negligence are
often highly personalized attacks, which many providers prefer to keep from
public view.  Opponents of a rbitration agreements, while noting that many of
                                                          
are involved.  Therefore, this study examines only use agreements between patients and providers and
plans and enrollees.
7. For a fuller listing and a discussion of several of these issues, see Thomas Metzloff, The
Unrealized Potential of Malpractice Arbitration, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 203, 208-10 (1996).
8. For a summary of the early empirical research on this subject, see Deborah Hensler & Jane
Adler, Court Ordered Arbitration: An Alternative View, LEGAL F. 399, 415-20 (1990). There is no
comparable research examining disputant satisfaction in the context of private, mandatory arbitration.
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these alleged benefits are unproven, also assert that pre-dispute arbitration
contracts unfairly compromise the rights and interests of disputants, especially
claimants.9  Their principal concerns include:
6.  Compromise Awards.  Opponents, particularly those in the medical
community, are concerned that arbitrators are overly reluctant to hand down a
defense verdict.  Instead arbitrators seem to prefer to “split the baby,”10 sending
the plaintiff home with a token award.
7. The “Repeat Player” Advantage.  Opponents argue that because plans and
providers are likely to be involved in numerous disputes over time, they are in
a position to develop relationships with neutrals and neutrals are likely to favor
them over claimants to gain future business.11
8. Loss of the Right to Appeal. Because binding arbitration is meant to be
dispositive, arbitration statutes, supported by subsequent court interpretation,
offer disputants few opportunities to challenge arbitration judgments in court.
Thus, under the terms of most pre-dispute arbitration agreements, disputants
have little recourse in the case of an unsatisfactory outcome, even in the event
of egregiously poor adjudication.12
9. Loss of Precedential Potential.  Unless disputants require otherwise,
arbitrators need not provide a written statement of their reasoning.  Even if
such a statement is required, it has no precedential value.  Thus, disputes
proceeding to resolution in arbitration are not integrated into the dynamic
process of creating case law.  Precisely because health care delivery is
undergoing such profound and rapid change, large numbers of health care
disputes should not be removed from the courts.13
Both lawmakers and the judiciary are now being asked to decide on the
appropriateness and value of these agreements, particularly in the context of
health care delivery.14  Unfortunately, the diffusion of arbitration agreements in
                                                          
9. See Elizabeth Rolph et al., Escaping the Courthouse: Private Dispute Resolution in Los
Angeles, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 277, 280.
10. Metzloff, supra note 7, at 220; see also A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF ALTERNATIVES TO
THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF RESOLVING MEDICAL DISPUTES 49-50 (Physicians Insurers Association of
America ed., 1989).
11. See generally S. Gale Dick, ADR at the Crossroads, 49 DISP. RESOL.J. 47 (Mar. 1994); Marc
Galanter & John Lande, Private Courts and Public Authority, 14 STUD. IN L., POL. & SOC'Y 393, 393-
415 (1992); Richard Reuben, The Dark Side of ADR, 14 CAL. LAW. 53, 53-58 (Feb. 1994).
12. See 9 U.S.C. §10 (1994) (limiting review of arbitrators' awards to instances of fraud,
corruption, bias and misconduct); see also Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 885 P.2d 994
(Cal. 1994) (limiting grounds of review of arbitrators' awards to fraud and conflict of interest on the
part of the arbitrator).
13. See generally Nicholas P. Terry, The Technical and Conceptual Flaws of Medical Malpractice
Arbitration, 30 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 571 (1986).
14. In California, for example, both the Senate Committee on Insurance and the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary held hearings in 1995 to review the use of binding arbitration agreements
in health care delivery and assess the need for regulation.  Similar review is underway in other states.
See 8:1 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 1 at 4-5 (1997).
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health care delivery, as well as nascent efforts to curb that diffusion, are both
proceeding in the absence of strong empirical evidence documenting the actual
numbers of medical arbitration agreements in use, or claims regarding their
costs and/or benefits.  Courts, legislators, and regulators need such evidence to
support the policy decisions that they must make, while plans and providers
need the same evidence to support their business decisions.
B.    Study Goals
The research we report on here is intended to inform the policy debate in
two important ways.  First, we attempt to identify potential outcomes suggested
by existing empirical literature on the use of binding contractual arbitration
agreements.  Second, in an empirically based study, we attempt to ascertain
actual patterns of diffusion and implementation of arbitration agreements
between enrollees/patients and plans/providers in health care delivery.
II
EFFECTS OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The existing evaluations of ADR programs suggest that there is reasonable
consensus on the dispute outcomes that should be measured.  These include the
following: caseload characteristics such as frequency and severity of claims;
time to disposition; transaction costs; patterns of awards and settlements,
including defense verdicts; disputant perceptions of fairness and satisfaction;
and quality of neutrals.
The conclusions from these studies, however, are problematic.15  Most of the
published work reports on the effects of non-binding, court-mandated
arbitration programs adopted as part of various court reform and tort reform
packages.  The few empirical evaluations of the effects of private, binding
arbitration suffer critical deficiencies; in most cases the evaluation designs are
eclectic and unclear, the arbitrated caseloads are small, and choices of
comparison populations are often dubious.
Although evaluations of non-binding, court-mandated arbitration have
produced interesting and somewhat consistent findings, it is important to
remember that court-mandated arbitration differs markedly from binding
contractual arbitration.  Therefore, these results have limited applicability in
predicting the effects of pre-dispute arbitration agreements.
The evidence indicates that non-binding, court-mandated arbitration is not
a substitute for trial; rather, it is a substitute for settlement.16  These programs
do not significantly reduce trial rates.  Where programs are in place, two to ten
times as many civil cases go to some form of adjudicative procedure as in courts
without them.17  Consistent with this interpretation, the research reveals very
                                                          
15. See generally Metzloff, supra note 7.
16. For an excellent summary and synthesis of the research on judicial arbitration, see Hensler &
Adler, supra note 8, at 407-08.
17. See id. at 407.
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mixed results with respect to time to disposition and private dispute costs.18  At
the same time, court-mandated programs consistently result in a high level of
disputant satisfaction with respect to both process and outcome.19
The effects of private, binding arbitration are even more difficult to
determine.  Some organizations that use arbitration agreements have
conducted internal evaluations,20 but the data necessary for a broad-based, non-
proprietary evaluation are widely dispersed, private, and often well guarded.21
Consequently, few studies of private arbitration have been undertaken,22 and
those that have attempted to evaluate outcomes suffer from the problems
described above.23  Notwithstanding these continuing questions about the
effects of binding arbitration, the next section of this article examines the use of
arbitration agreements in health care delivery in the context of a single state,
California.
III
USE OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN HEALTH CARE DELIVERY: A STUDY
OF CALIFORNIA
A.    Questions and Methods
In exploring patterns of diffusion and implementation of arbitration
agreements, this article will address the following issues:
• The legal context in which diffusion and implementation is proceeding;
• The prevalence of  such agreements;
• Patterns of use;
• Plan/provider reasons for use or non-use;
• Plan/provider perceptions regarding arbitration experiences; and
• Methods used to implement or execute agreements.
Despite a significant federal presence in this area, state legal and regulatory
environments do much to shape the adoption and implementation of
arbitration agreements.  Therefore, we chose to examine the experience of one
state in some detail, looking at both the contextual rules and the diffusion
                                                          
18. See id. at 410-14; see also DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., JUDICIAL ARBITRATION IN
CALIFORNIA: THE FIRST YEAR 39-44 (1983); ELIZABETH ROLPH, INTRODUCING COURT-ANNEXED
ARBITRATION: A POLICYMAKER’S GUIDE 19-20 (1984).
19. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 18, at 15-18.
20. For example, respondents in our interviews reported internal, proprietary analyses of certain
effects of arbitration agreements, e.g., defense costs, time to resolution, and award amounts.
21. For example, Kaiser, a long-time user of arbitration agreements, has as a matter of corporate
policy been unwilling to share data that would permit external evaluation.
22. See generally Rolph et al., supra note 9, at 277-323; ERIK MOLLER ET AL., PRIVATE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN THE BANKING INDUSTRY (1993); John P. Desmond, Michigan’s Medical Malpractice
Reform Revisited: Tighter Damage Caps and Arbitration Provisions, 11 COOLEY L. REV. 159, 173-77
(1994) (evaluating Michigan’s voluntary arbitration program for medical malpractice disputes).
23. See generally Rhoda M. Powsner & Frances Hamermesh, Medical Malpractice Crisis the
Second Time Around: Why Not Arbitrate?, 8 J. LEGAL MED. 283 (1987).
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response.  The state we selected is California, a state whose legal policies have
been very supportive of arbitration agreements and where a large portion of
the insured population, over forty percent,24 is enrolled in managed care plans.
Thus, in California there is both the possibility of using arbitration agreements
and a health care delivery system that arguably may lead to a greater demand
for innovative dispute resolution mechanisms.  To the degree that legal
environments in other states are similarly hospitable, it is reasonable to expect
that, as managed care gains similar market share in these states, similar dispute
resolution techniques are likely to follow.
We use a combination of methods for collecting empirical information
regarding the prevalence, expectations for, and experiences with arbitration
agreements.  Given the extreme complexity and current ambiguity of liability
relationships, we surveyed a broad variety of system participants, and, where
possible, supplemented these interviews with relevant data from other sources.
In presenting our results, we first describe the legal environment in California
as it relates to arbitration agreements.  We then describe the methods and
results of our empirical study, and, finally, discuss the implications of these
findings for the continuing diffusion of binding arbitration agreements.
B.    California’s Legal Context
The legal environment in which health care arbitration agreements occur is
simultaneously complex and fluid in its operation, and is shaped by both federal
and state law.  We first examine federal arbitration law, which provides the
fundamental limits on this area of law.  Second,  we examine regulation of
health care arbitration agreements at the state level, the point at which most
regulation actually occurs.  In addition, we discuss federal law regarding
employee benefits and state law on medical malpractice, both of which are
likely to affect the desirability of arbitration agreements to potential users.
1.  Federal Arbitration Law.  Federal support of private dispute resolution
agreements can be traced to the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (“FAA”).25
The FAA regulates the use of private agreements to arbitrate disputes and can
be characterized as supportive, preemptive, and emphasizing a contractual
approach to private arbitration agreements.  The statute provides for the
enforcement of agreements to have  disputes resolved through mechanisms of
the parties’ own choosing, outside of traditional litigation.  Thus, arbitration
clauses are enforceable against the parties to a contract for all disputes arising
out of the performance or interpretation of the contract.26  Courts must enforce
arbitration clauses “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.”27
                                                          
24. See THE INTERSTUDY COMPETITIVE EDGE PART II: HMO INDUSTRY REPORT 28 (1997).
25. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
26. See id § 2.
27. Id.
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Although arbitration and other alternatives to litigation existed prior to the
enactment of the FAA,28 such programs did not receive much government
support.  In fact, the judiciary traditionally opposed such alternatives.29 In the
years since the FAA was enacted, the use of arbitration in business disputes has
increased, as has the statute’s reach.  In a series of decisions beginning in the
late 1950s, the Supreme Court established a number of rules regarding the
interpretation of the FAA, concluding that the FAA is substantive rather than
procedural law,30 and that it was enacted by Congress pursuant to its power to
regulate interstate commerce.31  As a result of these decisions, the FAA
preempts state law32 in all instances in which interstate commerce is affected, to
the extent that state law is inconsistent with the FAA33 or “to the extent that it
‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.’”34
A recent U.S. Supreme Court opinion demonstrates the continuing support
this legislation enjoys.  In Doctor’s Associates v. Casarotto,35 the Court held that
state legislation treating arbitration clauses differently than other standard
contract language is inconsistent with the FAA.36  This decision established that
the basic issue of enforceability of contractual arbitration clauses is one
answered by federal law, and limited the state role in such interpretation.
Casarotto left unanswered the question of what remained within the state
purview with respect to arbitration agreements.
Recent state court decisions attempt to clarify the role of state law in the
interpretation of arbitration agreements by emphasizing that although
Casarotto appears to establish FAA preemption regarding those areas of the
law that Congress has chosen to occupy with that statute, only state law that is
inconsistent with FAA provisions or intent is preempted.  For example, prior to
Casarotto some courts had broadly interpreted the FAA’s preemptive effect to
preclude the application of state unconscionability law to arbitration contracts
                                                          
28. For example, arbitration has a history of use in international business disputes pre-dating the
jurisdiction of national courts.  Neither statutory nor common law, however, provided the appropriate
terms and conditions of its use.  Similarly, collective bargaining agreements often called for arbitration
to resolve labor disputes, thus avoiding recourse to more drastic measures such as strikes and lockouts.
For a discussion of the development of arbitration in the United States, see generally IAN R.
MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, INTER-
NATIONALIZATION (1992).
29. See id.
30. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956).
31. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-05 (1967).
32. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 20 (1983).
33. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
34. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 313 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
35. 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996).
36. Id. at 1657.  In Casarotto, the Supreme Court reviewed a Montana statute which required that
arbitration clauses be printed on the first page of any contract in underlined capital letters.  The Court
concluded that because the statute placed special burdens on arbitration clauses, and conditioned the
enforcement of such provisions on compliance with requirements not applicable to contracts generally,
it was preempted by the FAA.  See id.
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despite the fact that the statute did not address the issue of unconscionability.37
Casarotto, however, specifically identifies unconscionability as a state law
doctrine that “may be applied to invalidate arbitration clauses without
contravening [FAA] Section 2,” since the FAA does not speak to that issue.38
A recent California state court decision, in assessing the tension between
federal preemption under Casarotto and state arbitration law, concluded that
California law regarding the procedure used to compel arbitration is not
preempted by the FAA.39  The California Supreme Court stated that “[b]ecause
the California procedure for deciding motions to compel serves to further,
rather than defeat, full and uniform effectuation of the federal law’s objectives,
the California law, rather than Section 4 of the USAA [United States
Arbitration Act] is to be followed in California courts.”40  Accordingly,
although the FAA preempts state law where the two conflict, much of the
substantive law affecting the use of arbitration clauses may still be formed by
states.41
2.  California Arbitration Law.  In California, both legislative and judicial
policy-making have created a climate that is particularly conducive to
arbitration.  The California legislature has been consistently supportive of
arbitration agreements.  The California Civil Procedure Code (“CCP”)
specifically authorizes the use of arbitration clauses, consistent with the spirit
and terms of the FAA.42  The CCP states that “[a] written agreement to submit
to arbitration an existing controversy or a controversy thereafter arising is
valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, save upon grounds as exist for the
revocation of any contract.”43
Other California statutes regulate the use of arbitration agreements
between patients/enrollees and providers/plans, typically requiring particular
contractual formats to insure adequate disclosure.  Despite their regulatory
nature, these provisions were enacted as part of an effort to facilitate
arbitration of medical malpractice disputes by specifying standardized language
and formats for arbitration agreements, so that plans and providers following
these standards would know that their agreements were enforceable.  CCP
§1295(a) requires that arbitration clauses in contracts for the provision of
                                                          
37. See, e.g., Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282, 286 (9th Cir. 1988).
38. 116 S. Ct. at 1656.
39. Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Sec. Corp., 926 P.2d 1061 (Cal. 1996) (holding that whether a
party is entitled to jury trial to determine validity of an arbitration claim is matter of state law; noting
that the FAA does not state dispositively that jury trial is mandated to determine the issue of
arbitrability).
40. Id. at 1070.
41. See infra notes 46-82.  See also Broemmer v. Abortions Servs. of Phoenix, Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013
(Ariz. 1992) (holding an arbitration clause unconscionable under state law analysis).
42. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1280 et seq. (Deering 1981).  The FAA became the model for most
state laws that were subsequently enacted.  The California statutes that include the rules regulating
contractual arbitration clauses were in fact adopted in 1927, two years after the enactment of the FAA.
Both the FAA and the California statutes were based on arbitration laws passed in New York.
43. Id. § 1281.
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health care services must appear in the first article of the contract and must use
specific language.44  In addition, such contracts must have additional specific
language in at least ten-point bold red type immediately preceding the
signature line of the contract.45  Section 1295(e) specifically states that any
contract that complies with these requirements will not be deemed
unconscionable.46
By its own terms, Section 1295 does not govern arbitration provisions in
contracts between enrollees and health plans registered under the Knox-Keene
Act,47 which covers virtually all California HMOs.48  Other statutes, however,
require that HMOs that include binding arbitration agreements in their
enrollment contracts disclose them in clear and understandable language.49  The
California Insurance Code contains similar requirements for contractual
arbitration provisions in disability insurance policies and non-profit hospital
service plans.50
The California judiciary has been equally supportive of arbitration,
interpreting the CCP language as a broad policy declaration on the legitimacy
of arbitration agreements.  The California Supreme Court has explicitly
addressed two issues: the scope of arbitration agreements and the
enforceability of arbiters’ awards.  The court has generously interpreted the
reach of arbitration contracts in the context of health service agreements,
typically enforcing agreements in which parties attempted to escape arbitration
by claiming that they did not sign the contracts.  In Madden v. Kaiser
Foundation Hospitals,51 the court held that an employer acting as an agent for
its employees had the implicit authority to agree to a medical services contract
containing an arbitration clause.52 Madden established that arbitration clauses
can be enforced in the common situation where the enrollee against whom the
arbitration clause is being enforced is not actually the signatory to the clause.
The state’s lower courts have used similar analyses in other cases upholding
                                                          
44. If challenged today, it is likely that these statutes would be found preempted by the FAA,
since the provisions of § 1295 are quite similar to the Montana statute struck down in Casarotto.
45. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295(b) (Deering 1981).
46. Id. § 1295(e).
47. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1340-1399 (West 1990); the Knox-Keene Health Care
Service Plan Act of 1975 (“Knox-Keene Act”) was enacted to promote the provision of health care
services in California.  Health care service plans registered pursuant to the Knox-Keene Act include
plans that provide health care services in return for prepaid or periodic charges and are subject to
regulation by the Commissioner of Corporations.
48. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295(f) (Deering 1981)(excluding all plans registered pursuant to
the Knox-Keene Act).
49. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1363(a) (Deering 1988).  This statute would
arguably run afoul of the FAA.  State laws that place burdens on arbitration agreements beyond those
applicable to general contract law are inconsistent with the FAA and are therefore preempted.  See,
e.g., Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. at 1156.
50. See CAL. INS. CODE § 11512 (Deering 1988).  Again, these provisions would likely be
preempted by the FAA.
51. 552 P.2d 1178 (Cal. 1976).
52. Id. at 1184.
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the scope of arbitration agreements.  In Pietrelli v. Peacock,53 the California
Court of Appeals compelled arbitration of a claim brought by a minor against a
health care provider where an arbitration agreement was signed by the minor’s
mother before the minor was conceived.54  Additional decisions have
established that, in situations in which the non-signatory is represented by a
fiduciary (including an agent,55 parent,56 or spouse57) legally authorized to act on
his or her behalf, the arbitration clause will be upheld.  However, California
cases have held that if the arbitration clause is being enforced against an
individual who does not read or speak English, and if no attempt to
communicate the consequences of the terms of the agreement is made by the
care provider, no contract to arbitrate can be formed.58
California Supreme Court decisions regarding the enforceability of
arbitration agreements have established that such agreements can be avoided
only by showing fraud, duress, or unconscionability.59  The leading case in this
area is Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc.,60 in which the court concluded that a
contractual arbitration clause could be voided where the party injured by its
operation could prove (1) that the contract was one of adhesion, in that it was
imposed by a party with superior bargaining strength upon a party who had no
opportunity to reject it, and (2) that enforcement of the agreement was either
outside the reasonable expectations of the weaker party, or unduly oppressive
or unconscionable.61
Other applications of the Graham principles in the health care area are
illustrative.  Arbitration clauses containing terms that are fundamentally one-
sided will likely be found unconscionable.  For example, in Saika v. Gold,62 the
arbitration clause at issue included the right to seek trial if the arbitrator
awarded more than $25,000.63  The court found that this provision would rarely
assist patients, more often allowing physicians to escape unfavorable awards.64
Additionally, in Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc.,65 a mandatory arbitration clause in an
employment contract was found to be unconscionable where it allowed issues
                                                          
53. 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 688, 691 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
54. Id. at 695.
55. See Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 552 P.2d 1178, 1184 (Cal. 1976).
56. See Doyle v. Giuliucci, 401 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1965); Wilson v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 190 Cal.
Rptr. 649 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
57. See Hawkins v. Superior Court, 152 Cal. Rptr. 491 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
58. See Ramirez v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. Rptr. 223 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
59. See, e.g., Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 885 P.2d 994 (Cal. 1994).  This rule
reflects contract law applicable to all contracts and is therefore consistent with both Casarotto and the
language of California Civil Procedure Code § 1281.
60. 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981).
61. Id. at 172-73.  In Graham, the contract at issue required arbitration before the American
Federation of Musicians.  Since one of the parties to the contract was a member of the AFM, the court
found that this contract was unconscionable, despite the fact that the party against whom the provision
was to be enforced was a sophisticated businessman.  Id. at 179-80.
62. 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
63. Id. at 924.
64. Id. at 925-26.
65. 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 151-52 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
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of importance to the employer to be litigated but required issues of importance
to the employee to be arbitrated.  Additionally, fair notice of the existence of
an arbitration clause is likely necessary before the clause is deemed
enforceable.  In Bell v. Congress Mortgage Co., Inc.,66 the California Court of
Appeals held that an arbitration clause in mortgage documents was not
enforceable where it was buried in non-negotiable, standardized agreements
between elderly homeowners and a lender.  The Bell court stated that “the
enforceability of a compelled arbitration provision in a contract of adhesion
requires that the provision appear in a clear and unmistakable form.”67  As
previously stated, however, California courts have broadly interpreted the
scope of arbitration clauses in the absence of fairly egregious flaws.
In addition to broadly interpreting the reach of arbitration clauses,
California law also significantly limits review of an arbitrator’s award.  In
general, an arbitrator’s decision can be overturned only where “procured by
corruption, fraud, or other undue means,”68 or where the rights of a party were
prejudiced by arbitrator misconduct.69  The courts have used this legislation to
afford arbitrators wide discretion.  In Moncharch v. Heily & Blase,70 the
California Supreme Court held that the legislature intended to limit the review
of arbitrator decisions to those grounds specifically delineated in Section 1286.2
(that is, corruption, fraud or other undue means) ruling that even where a
decision may be in error, it cannot be reviewed by the courts absent a showing
of fraud or bias on the part of the arbitrator.  Likewise, in Advanced Micro
Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp.,71 the court upheld an award fashioned by an
arbitrator that was not sought by either party.72 The Advanced Micro Devices
court stated that an arbitrator has the power to create an award that is based on
the contract at issue in the dispute, even if the basis of such an award is a
tenuous one.73
The California Supreme Court recently revisited the issue of the
enforceability of mandatory arbitration clauses in Engalla v. Permanente
Medical Group, Inc.74  In Engalla, the court held that the Kaiser-administered
arbitration, as operated, might provide the basis for a fraudulent inducement or
waiver defense to the enforcement of an arbitration clause.  In the case, the
claimants produced evidence that showed Kaiser, despite the persistent efforts
of the claimants’ attorneys to expedite the process, had delayed selection of the
                                                          
66. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205, 210 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
67. Id. at 210; see also Patterson v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563, 566-67 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1993) (Minnesota venue forced on a California consumer in a small-dollar dispute found
unconscionable).
68. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1286.2(a),(b) (Deering Supp. 1997).
69. See id. §§ 1286.2(c), (e).
70. 832 P.2d 899, 919 (Cal. 1992).
71. 885 P.2d 994 (Cal. 1994).
72. Id. at 996.
73. Id. at 1005 (“The remedy awarded, however, must bear some rational relationship to the
contract and the breach.”).
74. 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997).
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third neutral arbitrator,75 thereby preventing the case from going forward.76
During this period, Mr. Engalla died.  The claimants also produced evidence
from a Kaiser-sponsored study documenting that, despite the terms of the
Kaiser arbitration agreement, which required the selection of a third neutral
arbitrator within sixty days of the claim,77 neutral arbitrators were rarely
appointed in that time, and that in fact the average time to appointment was
674 days.
The court held that Kaiser’s actions arguably constituted both fraud in the
inducement of the contract and waiver of its right to compel arbitration, and
remanded the case to the trial court for further litigation on these issues.78  The
court, however, rejected the claimants’ argument that the arbitration clause was
unconscionable under Graham.79  In reaching this conclusion, it stated that
“although the present contract has some of the attributes of adhesion, it does
not, on its face, lack ‘minimum levels of integrity.’”80  The terms of the contract
itself were not defective; rather, it was the gap between the “contractual
representations and the actual workings of the arbitration program.”81  In
concurrence, Justices Kennard and Werdegar cautioned “that new possibilities
for unfairness arise as arbitration ventures move beyond the world of
merchant-to-merchant disputes in which it was conceived and into the world of
consumer transactions.”82
The court’s analysis of the arbitration procedure in Engalla, coupled with
the concurrence of Justices Kennard and Werdegar, suggests the possibility of
an important shift in future legal analyses of arbitration agreements.  It seems
likely that the question of unconscionability has been adequately addressed and
that future analyses will turn to the question of procedural fairness.  Courts will
focus less on the relationship between the parties and more on the specific
practices employed in the execution of arbitration agreements.83  Issues could
include timeliness of proceedings, overall fairness of proceedings,84
                                                          
75. Kaiser arbitration agreements provide for two party arbitrators, one chosen by each side in the
dispute, and one neutral arbitrator chosen by the two party arbitrators.  The one neutral arbitrator
thus becomes the lynchpin of the arbitration process.
76. Engalla, 938 P.2d at 911-12.
77. Kaiser arbitration rules require that each party choose a party arbitrator within 30 days of the
service of the claim, and that the party arbitrators choose the neutral arbitrator within 30 days
thereafter.
78. Engalla, 938 P.2d at 922-24.
79. Id. at 925.
80. Id.
81. Id
82. Id. at 926.
83. See, e.g., Cheng-Canindin v. Renaissance Hotel Ass’ns, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 867, 874-76 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1996) (refusing to enforce arbitration clause, where procedure required complaints to be heard
by an internal review committee, because procedure did not constitute arbitration; clause did not,
therefore, constitute waiver of right to trial).
84. Arbitrator bias is an aspect of procedural fairness that is already the subject of legislation and
judicial review.  See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (Deering 1981).  The California Supreme Court
has ruled that although the possible bias of an arbitrator does not invalidate a mandatory arbitration
agreement, it is grounds for vacating the arbitrator’s decision.  See, e.g., Neaman v. Kaiser Found.
Hosp., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 879 (1992).
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qualifications of arbitrators, fairness of discovery and evidentiary rules, and fair
allocation of costs.
The Engalla decision suggests that providers and health plans will have to
exercise additional procedural diligence to ensure that their arbitration
practices are above challenge.  Whether or not such diligence imposes
significant additional burdens on those choosing to use agreements, thus
reducing their incentives to incorporate agreements into their business
relationships, remains to be seen.
3.  Other Statutes Affecting the Use of Arbitration Agreements.  In addition
to statutes directly regulating the use of arbitration agreements, two other
statutes may well play a role in determining whether California health plans
and providers find private, binding arbitration an attractive alternative to the
courts.  These statutes are the federal Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (“ERISA”)85 and California’s Medical Injury Compensation
Reform Act of 1975 (“MICRA”),86 each of which has provisions that are likely
to limit the attractiveness of private arbitration agreements.
ERISA preempts state control of employee health benefit plans, although it
specifically preserves the rights of states to regulate the business of insurance.87
The insurance savings clause notwithstanding, the practical effect of the statute
has been that ERISA governs the terms and implementation of private sector
employee benefits; it does not extend to insured but self-employed workers,
government employees, or to those who purchase health insurance as
individuals.88  In general, ERISA preemption of state law is viewed as
benefiting health plans because, in the event of a wrongful denial of coverage,
ERISA limits damages to the difference between the benefits that should have
been provided and the benefits that were provided, plus legal fees, and does not
permit other damages of any kind.89
The courts have determined that coverage provisions and determinations
pertain to “benefits due … under the terms of the [plan]”90 and that state
regulation of coverage is accordingly preempted by ERISA.91  At the same
time, recent federal judicial decisions have held that actions regarding the
quality of benefits received are not claims to recover benefits, and are therefore
                                                          
85. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
86. MICRA is codified at CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6146, CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333, and CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 340.5, 1295.  The various provisions of MICRA were subject to and withstood
constitutional challenge in the California courts over a ten-year period.  See, e.g., Roa v. Lodi Medical
Group, 695 P.2d 164 (Cal. 1985) (upholding CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6146); Fein v. Permanente
Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985) (upholding CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 3333.2); Barme v. Wood,
689 P.2d 446 (Cal. 1984) (upholding CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 3333.1).
87. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(a) (1994).
88. See id.  § 1321(b).
89. See id.  § 1132(g).
90. See id.  § 1132(a)(1)(b).
91. See id. §1144(a) (ERISA “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they now or
hereafter relate to any employment benefit plan.”).
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not claims preempted by ERISA.92  These decisions also point out that the
distinction between actions to recover benefits (coverage disputes) and actions
over the quality of benefits (treatment decisions and technical competence) is
not always easy to make.93  Rather, commentators argue, it is an artificial
distinction prompted by the existence of ERISA.94
ERISA in no way limits the use of binding arbitration or arbitration
agreements to resolve disputes that might arise under its provisions.  However,
it does place the coverage provisions and decisions of employee health plans
beyond the reach of state regulation.  Even where fault on the part of a
provider might exist, potential awards are severely limited, and, as such, will
not attract the attention of many plaintiffs’ attorneys.  Thus, with ERISA in
place, health plans might feel little pressure to initiate new forms of dispute
resolution.
MICRA, the second statute that might be expected to provide a contextual
influence on decisions to use medical arbitration agreements, without directly
regulating such agreements, resulted from a perceived crisis in the health care
industry in the early 1970s.  Increases in claims and awards prompted private
malpractice insurers to leave the market.95  In response, almost every state
adopted statutory tort reforms in the medical malpractice area.  California
enacted MICRA in 1975.
Among other prescriptions, MICRA imposes the following rules on all
medical malpractice actions in California, including arbitration claims:
• Non-economic damages, including pain, suffering, inconvenience, and
disfigurement are limited to $250,000;96
• Evidence of collateral sources for compensation of injuries, such as 
workers’ compensation benefits or health or disability insurance, is 
admissible as evidence at the discretion of the defendant;97
• Future damage awards for lost wages or medical costs can be paid 
periodically instead of as a lump sum;98 and
                                                          
92. See, e.g., Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995); Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, 57 F.3d 350
(3d Cir. 1995); Lancaster v. Kaiser Found., 958 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D. Va. 1997); Roessert v. Health Net,
929 F. Supp. 343 (N.D. Ca. 1996).  In Dukes, the Third Circuit reversed a trial court decision to remove
a medical malpractice action to federal court, concluding that the plaintiff's complaint concerned the
quality of a benefit provided under an ERISA plan, rather than coverage; accordingly, “complete
[federal] preemption” did not apply.  Dukes, 57 F.3d at 356-57.
93. See Dukes, 57 F.3d at 358.  In addition, some states have attempted to legislate HMO liability
for medical malpractice actions.  New York and Texas have passed statutes that would hold HMOs to
a “reasonable care” standard when they decide to delay or deny payment for treatment.  These
statutes would of course apply to cases in which there is no ERISA preemption.  Their application to
health care plans, which otherwise would be subject to ERISA regulation, depends on future
interpretation of the courts.
94. See, e.g., Sage, supra note 5, at 14-15.
95. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: CASE STUDY ON
CALIFORNIA  (1986).
96. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (Deering 1984).
97. See id. § 3333.1.
98. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 667.7 (Deering 1983).
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• Contingency fees are limited according to a sliding scale.99
Although there is no empirical evidence documenting the effects of
MICRA on claiming behavior and awards, the statute will likely reduce interest
in arbitration agreements.  First, one of the traditional benefits attributed to
arbitration is that it allows defendants to avoid the possibility of the “runaway”
jury award.  In the medical malpractice area, however, MICRA already limits
jury discretion.100  Therefore, the marginal value of arbitration to defendants in
medical malpractice suits is likely to be less than in other areas of litigation.
Although the damage cap and other provisions of MICRA both reduce the
potential size of any award and limit contingency fees, making medical
malpractice claims less attractive to plaintiff attorneys than they were before
MICRA, litigation costs may be lower if cases are subject to arbitration.  Thus,
plaintiffs’ attorneys may be willing to accept lower valued cases providing that
the cases are subject to arbitration.  Potential defendants might then be
expected to avoid using instruments that could increase the ability of a claimant
to find representation and bring suit.
In sum, arbitration agreements in the context of health care delivery find a
hospitable legal climate in California.  Federal law is supportive and
preemptive.  State law is similarly supportive, generously interpreting the reach
and enforceability of agreements.  Substantial room exists, however, for further
regulation of procedural requirements and practices.  At the same time,
statutes that are not in any way intended to regulate the use of agreements,
such as ERISA and MICRA, have the potential to significantly affect the value
of agreements to potential users.  The next section explores these potential
effects, among other issues, as it looks at the prevalence of agreements and the
rationales underlying their implementation.
C.    Decisionmakers and Data Collection
The legal climate in California presents no real barrier to the adoption of
arbitration agreements, so diffusion of such agreements depends principally on
the choices of those involved in the delivery of care.  A central question is who,
among the many participants in health care delivery, might see themselves as
benefiting from the use of such agreements?
There are three major points of professional intervention in the rendering
of health care where conflict may arise: coverage decisions; treatment
decisions; and provision of treatment.  As Table 1 indicates, different
participants in the delivery system typically bear responsibility at each of these
points; these participants may differ between fee-for-service and managed care
plans.  In the traditional, fee-for-service delivery environment, virtually all the
disputes between enrollees/patients and plans/providers fall in the category of
professional liability or negligence disputes, and they are disputes between
                                                          
99. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (Deering 1983).
100. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
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patients and providers.101  In managed care, payers scrutinize treatment plans
and deny coverage for care, which not only raises additional opportunities for
disputes but also paves the way for new types of disputants.
TABLE 1
WHO MAKES THE DECISIONS?
Fee-For-Service Managed Care
Coverage
     Decisions




     Decisions
Physicians Health Plan Physician
Provision Of
      Treatment
Physicians Hospitals Physician
Hospital (Health Plan, Hmo*)
*As discussed above, statutory and case law are expanding the scope of responsibility for quality
of care to include health plans and HMOs.  In addition to coverage decisions, plans may become
responsible for the treatment choices and technical competence of their providers.
This framework suggests that there are three important types of
participants in health care delivery that might adopt arbitration agreements:
physicians, hospitals, and insuring/risk-bearing entities such as self-insuring
employers,102 HMOs, and health insurance plans.  These are all groups that
would themselves be parties to the agreements.
In addition to these principals, one might readily imagine that a secondary
tier of participants—medical malpractice insurers and trade associations—
would play some role in encouraging or discouraging the use of agreements by
principals.  Medical malpractice insurers ultimately pay much of the cost of
disputes and awards; thus they are likely to have strong preferences regarding
arbitration agreements depending on whether they believe such agreements
ultimately reduce their costs.  The insurers might be expected to put strong
pressure on their insureds either to use or avoid such agreements.  It also seems
possible that trade associations—organizations that often collect information
from their membership to illuminate common problems—might have
conducted some research into the value of arbitration agreements for their
membership and are now playing some role in promoting or discouraging their
use by members.  This group of decision shapers and makers is the object of
our current analysis.
                                                          
101. As we use it, the term “provider” encompasses both physicians and hospitals.
102. Although self-insured employers do bear risk and make coverage decisions, we were not able
to include them in this study.  However, conversations with the California Business Group on Health
suggest that large employers have not yet focused on dispute resolution alternatives.  Their lack of
concern may well be due to the fact that coverage disputes are very rare.
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We used close-ended mail surveys to collect information from physicians
and hospitals, mailing questionnaires to a random sample of 800 California
physicians103 and a stratified random sample of ninety-nine state hospitals.  The
physician sample was constructed from the List Source, a California Medical
Association list of all resident and licensed physicians.104  The hospital sample
was constructed using the twelve largest hospitals (based on number of beds,
occupancy rates, and outpatient visits) and a random sample of eighty-seven
hospitals drawn from the 532 California hospitals listed in the 1995 American
Hospital Guide.105  We achieved response rates of forty-seven percent and forty-
nine percent respectively for the physician and hospital surveys.106  Subsequent
analysis points to some response bias in the hospital group; the data we present
has been adjusted to account for the bias.107
We used open-ended personal interviews (some in person and some by
telephone) to collect information from health plans, malpractice insurers,
arbitration services, and trade associations.  We interviewed the state’s six
largest HMOs (accounting for ninety percent of the state’s enrollment), five
health insurers with the largest PPO enrollments,108 the state’s five largest
medical malpractice insurers, the two most prominent arbitration services, and
three major trade associations (California Medical Association, California
Healthcare Association, and the California Association of HMOs
(“CAHMO”)).109  We augmented our health plan interview data with
information from a 1995 survey of member HMOs conducted by CAHMO
                                                          
103. We made additional attempts to collect information from nonrespondents in the form of two
additional mailings and one telephone follow-up.
104. Before drawing our sample of 800 from the list of approximately 80,000 physicians, we
excluded all retired and federally employed physicians and physicians who no longer practice in
California.
105. AMERICAN HOSP. ASS’N, 1995 GUIDE TO THE HEALTH CARE FIELD A36-67 (1995).  We
made follow-up telephone calls to nonresponding hospitals.
106. We mailed questionnaires to a random sample of physicians and made further attempts to
collect information from nonrespondents with two additional mail follow-ups and one additional
telephone follow-up. Similarly, we performed two mailings with follow-up telephone calls to each
nonrespondent hospital.
107. To address the possibility of meaningful differences between respondents and nonrespondents,
we compared the available characteristics of the two groups.  The physician list provided only
addresses, and a comparison of the two groups of physicians by zip code suggested no statistically
significant differences (p<0.05).  Similarly, there was little evidence of response bias with respect to
hospital size.  An analysis of hospital location indicated a marginal statistically significant difference in
response rates, with hospitals from Northern and Central California being somewhat more likely to
respond to our surveys (p<0.05).  At the same time, we should note that Kaiser hospitals made a
uniform decision not to reply to our survey.  Thus, the estimate of the use of agreements by hospitals in
Table 2 is adjusted to account for no response by Kaiser.  We separated the population of California
hospitals into two groups, Kaiser and non-Kaiser.  We estimated the non-Kaiser group’s rate of using
arbitration agreements from our hospital survey and estimated the Kaiser group’s rate as 100%.  We
report weighted averages of these two rates using weights proportional to the fraction of hospitals and
the fraction of admissions from Kaiser hospitals in lines 2 and 3 of Table 2.
108. Of the HMOs and health plans, we attempted interviews with Kaiser, Health Net,
PacificCare/FHP, Blue Cross, Blue Shield, Aetna, CIGNA, and Prudential.  Blue Cross declined to
participate.
109. CAHMO has recently changed its name to California Association of Health Plans.
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regarding the use of arbitration agreements.110
Our chief goals were to determine the prevalence of agreements, to identify
concentrated groups of those with agreements in place, and to identify sources
of data in an effort to determine the feasibility of a follow-up statistical
evaluation of outcomes when agreements are in force.  We also wanted to
collect preliminary information on the rationales underlying choices regarding
arbitration agreements.  In both the mail survey and personal interviews, we
asked for information on the following: whether respondents or their
organizations used or recommended using arbitration agreements and the
reasons for this choice; the implementation practices and satisfaction levels of
those using or recommending the use of arbitration agreements; and the
business characteristics and claims experience of providers, plans, and insurers.
D.    Findings
1.  Prevalence of Agreements Among Providers.  Our survey of doctors and
hospitals demonstrated that the use of arbitration agreements between
providers and patients is not particularly widespread.  As the Table 2 estimates
show, only nine percent of the hospitals and nine percent of the physicians we
surveyed use such agreements.  Twenty percent of patients admitted to
hospitals, however, are admitted to hospitals that use arbitration agreements.
Thus, patients encounter agreements in hospital settings with some frequency.
TABLE 2*





Percent Of Physicians         9%     91%     369
Percent Of Hospitals*         9%     91%       99
Percent Hospital
     Admissions*        20%     80%     NA
*The total number of physicians may vary across tables because of missing responses. See
discussion in footnote 106 regarding the number of hospitals in the sample.
Although the percentage of physicians using agreements is small, it is
increasing.  More than sixty percent of physicians currently using agreements
have adopted them since 1990, suggesting that a reasonably persistent diffusion
                                                          
110. In 1995, CAHMO asked its members to provide information on their use of arbitration
agreements in a broad range of business relationships, including their use of agreements with
purchasers and enrollees.  Twenty-eight of the 32 members responded, including all of the large
HMOs.  CAHMO made the results of this survey available in 1996.  See CALIFORNIA ASS’N OF
HEALTH PLANS, SURVEY ON USE OF BINDING ARBITRATION (1996).
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process is underway in the physician community.111
Two  factors that appear to underlie the diffusion of arbitration agreements
among providers are insurer support for use of such agreements and practice in
an HMO setting.  Our survey indicates that arbitration agreements are
concentrated in a few identifiable groups of physicians who share one or both
of these traits.  As the Table 3 estimates show, fifty percent of the physician
members of CAP/MPT, a professional liability coverage provider that strongly
encourages its members to use arbitration agreements in their practices, have
agreements in place,  compared with only six percent of physicians insured by
other carriers.112  We estimate that forty percent of those physicians who
practice in an HMO setting use arbitration agreements, compared to only eight
percent of those who do not.
Use of arbitration agreements also appears to be linked to a provider’s
claims experience.  Only seven percent of the physicians reporting no
malpractice claims in the last five years use agreements, compared to sixteen
percent who have had claims against them in that period.113  Whether or not
physicians use agreements is not related to their years in practice.
TABLE 3





Member Of CAP/MPT                50%        50%     32
Not Insured With
     CAP/MPT                  6%         94%
  335
TOTAL*               9.5%       90.5%   367
NOTE:  Differences statistically significant(p<0.05).
*Totals represent only those respondents answering the question.
2.  Prevalence of Agreements among Plans.  Use of arbitration agreements
                                                          
111. For a comprehensive discussion of the research on innovation diffusion, see generally
EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATION (1995).
112. CAP/MPT has a well-developed program to educate and encourage its members to use
arbitration agreements; they particularly target the high-risk specialties, including orthopedic surgery,
obstetrics, and neurosurgery.  Each newly insured physician is presented with materials that explain
arbitration and its benefits, suggest how agreements can be incorporated into the normal paperwork
for new patients, and encourage the physician to make arbitration agreements the standard in his or
her office.  CAP/MPT also provides physicians with a continuous and complimentary supply of
standardized agreement forms and offers to train the physician’s office staff to obtain and file
agreements.  The company repeats its efforts to persuade physicians to incorporate the use of
agreements into their standard office practice when physicians who have not been using agreements
find themselves party to a malpractice claim.
113. This difference is statistically significant (p<0.05).  These data may reflect the fact that
CAP/MPT, as part of its physician education and risk management program, makes a special effort to
introduce agreements into physicians’ practices at the time of any suit.
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by managed health plans114 presents quite a different picture; most HMOs
incorporate arbitration agreements into their contracts with purchasers and
enrollees, while preferred provider organizations (“PPOs”) do not.115  CAHMO
reports that twenty (seventy-one percent) of the twenty-eight HMO
respondents in its 1995 survey of members used arbitration agreements with
enrollees.116  In sharp contrast, none of the health plans that provided
information reported using agreements with those enrolling in their PPO plans.
Insurers that offered both HMO and PPO products (for example, Prudential)
reported using agreements differentially among products.
However, of the HMOs that used agreements, most designed them to apply
only to contract disputes and not to the professional liability of their providers.
In only eight of the twenty instances where HMOs reported using agreements
with enrollees—the agreements of Kaiser, CIGNA, and six very small plans—
did those agreements apply to both contractual and medical malpractice
disputes.117  These plans seemed to share no explanatory characteristics.  Group
members included the largest and some of the smallest plans, a mixture of types
of plans, and plans owned by for-profit and not-for-profit companies.
3.  The Arbitration Caseload.  A full appreciation of the reach of arbitration
agreements necessitates going beyond evaluation of the prevalence of such
agreements.  It is also important to consider whether these disputes are
predominantly coverage or malpractice disputes and to determine the
proportion of the dispute caseload that goes to arbitration.
Regarding the types of disputes that are typically arbitrated, only
fragmentary information exists describing the dispute caseloads of providers
and health plans.  However, that information strongly suggests that arbitrated
disputes are almost exclusively medical malpractice disputes.  Despite the fact
that most HMOs in California use arbitration agreements, their agreements
typically apply only to coverage disputes, and the number of coverage disputes
is negligible.  In the CAHMO survey, responding plans reported an annual
average of only four coverage disputes per one million enrollees in contrast to
an annual average of 102 claims per one million enrollees for medical
malpractice disputes.118  While these data probably capture virtually all of the
                                                          
114. We have restricted our inquiry to the two principal types of managed care plans: HMOs and
PPOs.
115. We have limited our investigation to managed care products, reasoning that fee-for-service
plans do not make coverage decisions or direct patients to providers.
116. Subsequent to the CAHMO survey, FHP merged with PacifiCare, and, since January, 1997,
the merged HMO has used agreements in all new service agreements.
117. Subsequent to the CAHMO survey, CIGNA, formerly a staff model HMO, divested itself of
its clinics and physician contracts, shifting to a network model.  At the same time, it relinquished
responsibility for any negligence on the part of its physicians, and its agreements now only apply to
coverage disputes.
118. The CAHMO survey response rates for these questions was problematic.  Respondents were
asked for information for each of five years and many were able to provide information for only a few
of these years.  Regarding medical malpractice, only CIGNA and Kaiser responded.  Thus, these
figures are suggestive only of the great difference in the numbers of coverage and medical malpractice
disputes currently being brought.
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coverage claims brought in California, they do not begin to account for all of
the medical malpractice disputes, most of which arise outside of the purview of
reporting HMOs.  These findings are consistent with the interpretation (despite
public perceptions to the contrary)119 that ERISA provisions, in combination
with the mandatory Medicare appeals process,120 have actually removed
coverage, for the most part, as a matter for litigation.
Our information on the proportion of medical malpractice disputes that are
arbitrated is inconclusive.  Caseload data from Kaiser and the state’s largest
medical malpractice insurers suggest that approximately ten percent of their
medical malpractice disputes are arbitrated, a number that is consistent with
the proportion of physicians who report using arbitration.  However, the
physicians responding to our survey report arbitrating more than twenty-five
percent of the claims against them, perhaps reflecting some confusion on their
part regarding what arbitration is and/or how their claims were, in fact,
handled.  We do not have data on hospital disputes.121
4.  Incentives, Rationales, and Satisfaction Rates.  External pressures play a
significant role in determining whether physicians choose to use arbitration
agreements.  As Table 4 shows,122 more than half (fifty seven percent) of the
respondents in our physician survey who use agreements reported that they do
so because their insurer so recommends.  Nearly one third (thirty-one percent)
of those using agreements reported they do so because it is the policy of their
practice group.  Finally, more than one third (thirty-four percent) reported
using them because they believe arbitration is a less expensive way to resolve
disputes.123
                                                          
    119.  Media coverage of recent and extremely high awards has put coverage disputes in the public
eye.  See, e.g.,  Dawn Hobbs, Lawyer Raises Questions on Choosing HMO, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1997,
at B1 (reporting on $89.9 million damage award).
120. 42 U.S.C. §1395(c)(5) (Supp. V 1988).  For a description of the Medicare appeals process, see
Eleanor D. Kinney, Medicare Managed Care from the Beneficiary’s Perspective, 26 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1163, 1179-80 (1996).
121. Most hospitals self-insure, and we did not ask for information on their claims history in our
survey.
122. Only physicians using arbitration agreements are included in Table 4 because only two
hospitals reported using arbitration agreements; their reasons may be idiosyncratic and are not
reported here.
123. Other reasons identified less frequently for using arbitration clauses include colleague
recommendations and avoiding litigious patients.
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TABLE 4
LEADING REASONS OF PHYSICIANS  FOR USING
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
Number Of Physicians
                  (N=35)
    Percent*
Insurer Recommends                      20          57%
Arbitration Cheaper                      12          34%
Policy Of Group                      11          31%
Avoid Juries                        8          23%
Avoid Courts                        7          20%
*Percent sums to more than 100 because respondents were asked to “circle all that apply.”  Table
reflects respondent physicians only.
Of the physicians in our sample with arbitration agreements in place, ninety
six percent are generally satisfied with them.  Satisfaction was as high among
those with actual arbitration experience as it was among providers as a whole.
Physicians and hospitals gave similar but not identical reasons for not using
agreements.  Table 5 shows that the principal reason physicians gave for not
using arbitration agreements was lack of familiarity with them (forty percent of
those without agreements in place).  Almost a third (thirty-one percent) of
those without agreements reported they do not use them because “they set the
wrong tone” for the patient.  Other factors, including policies of insurers or of
medical groups (twenty-three percent), or greater likelihood of winning in
court, do not appear to play as large a role in their decision-making.124
Similarly, more than one third (thirty-six percent) of the responding hospitals
reported they do not use arbitration agreements because agreements “set the
wrong tone” for patients.  Twenty-six percent reported they do not use
agreements in accordance with the policy of a hospital’s corporate owner.
Other rationales apparently play only minor roles in hospital decisionmaking.125
                                                          
124. Respondents were asked to “circle all that apply.”  Therefore, these categories are not
mutually exclusive.
125. Since most of the responding hospitals self-insure against malpractice suits, the influence of
malpractice insurers is not relevant to this population.
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TABLE 5
LEADING REASONS  OF PHYSICIANS AND HOSPITALS  FOR NOT USING
AGREEMENTS
  Physicians Hospitals
Not Familiar With Them         40%      19%
Wrong Tone For Patient         31%      36%
Policy Of Group Or
     Corporate Owner
        23%      26%
Total Number         367       47
NOTE:  Table reflects respondent sample only.
Health plans, HMOs, and PPOs reported different rationales for using
arbitration agreements.  The HMOs we interviewed reported a homogeneous
set of rationales for adopting agreements, which typically related to controlling
costs.  They characterized arbitration as a cheaper, faster process that “insures
that the right issues will be considered” and “protects against the “runaway
award.”  One user emphasized that arbitration’s procedural informality and
speed greatly reduce the demands on their doctors.  Respondents representing
California’s largest preferred provider health plans reported that their PPOs
did not use agreements but that they did not know why; it appeared the plans
had not seriously considered the question at a policy level.126
Although no malpractice insurers directly mandate use of agreements as a
precondition of coverage, our research suggests that such insurers greatly
influence decisions of physicians (see Table 3).  The one malpractice insurer (of
the five we interviewed) urging the use of agreements does so to reduce
transaction costs, save time, reduce the demands on their insured physicians,
and to get knowledgeable adjudicators - all the standard reasons.  That insurer
contends that its arbitrated caseload costs thirty-three percent less to defend
than its trial track caseload.127
Only one of the four major California malpractice insurers that do not
encourage their insureds to use arbitration agreements does so as a matter of
policy.  This insurer strongly avers that “with MICRA, we get better results in
court.”  The other three report having “no policy” regarding agreements,
although they, too, subscribe to the belief that arbitration is more likely to
result in some indemnification of doctors because “arbitrators tend to split the
baby.”  One insurance company representative attributes her firm’s failure to
adopt a position to the fact that it was a doctor-owned company and “doctors
                                                          
126. Blue Cross, one of California’s largest PPOs, declined to participate in our survey.  We
understand, however, that Blue Cross does use arbitration agreements, making that PPO the
exception.
127. Hearing on the Advantages of the California Arbitration System Before the California
Department of Insurance (Ca.  1997) (statement of Gordon T. Ownby, General Counsel, CAP/MPT).
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believed use of agreements set the wrong tone” in the doctor-patient
relationship.128  Several respondents suggest that the perception that arbitrators
are reluctant to render defense verdicts may be a significant barrier to the use
of arbitration.  Today’s doctors are increasingly anxious to avoid any
indemnification since all settlements and awards, irrespective of the size or
forum of dispute resolution, must be reported to the National Practitioner Data
Bank and become a matter of public record; any reports of judgments against
providers may pose a serious obstacle to securing contracts with managed care
plans.
Despite their negative comments, the four malpractice insurers not
currently encouraging the use of arbitration indicated a moderate to strong
interest in it.  These insurers stated that if they could document the claimed
efficiencies of the arbitration process, their companies would likely follow in
CAP/MPT’s footsteps.  At the time of our interview, one insurer was actively
considering a policy of proactive support for arbitration.
5.  Rules and Insights into Implementation.  Typically, the agreements in
force are quite general in their provisions and are self-administering.
Seventeen (eighty-five percent) of the twenty HMOs that use agreements, as
well as a few physicians, report that their agreements specify that the American
Arbitration Association (“AAA”) or JAMS/Endispute will administer the
arbitration of disputes according to the rather detailed rules and procedures of
those organizations.  However, consistent with our finding that there are very
few coverage disputes, data from the two dispute resolution services reveal that
neither one oversees more than a couple of health care disputes a year.  In fact,
both Kaiser and CAP/MPT physicians are parties in the vast majority of
arbitrated disputes (which concern medical malpractice rather than coverage)
and their agreements do not provide for the use of an arbitration service.
Rather, their agreements set forth the rules for a self-administering process.
These rules provide only the most basic procedural framework, and compliance
is left up to the parties.  To force the compliance of a recalcitrant party, an
aggrieved party must go to court.  Those matters not specified are left to the
discretion of the neutral arbitrators.
In Table 6, we have grouped the rules that govern the conduct of disputes
into eight basic categories to compare those used by Kaiser, CAP/MPT, and
AAA.129
                                                          
128. The medical malpractice carriers we interviewed all began as doctor-owned companies,
although one recently went public.
129. We have not included the rules used by JAMS/Endispute because this service provider was
specified as the provider of choice in only a few contracts.  However, their rules do not differ markedly
from those of AAA.
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TABLE 6
VARIATION OF ARBITRATION RULES
Kaiser CAP/MPT AAA
Number Of
     Arbitrators
1 If Damages <$200K;
3 If Damages >$200K.
3 Unless The Parties
Agree To 1.
1 If Damages <$100K;
3 If Damages >$100K.
Arbitrator
     Selection
     Rules













Payment Own Arbitrator &
Share Of Neutral
Arbitrator And Costs.










































No Requirement. No Requirement.
Governing







     Of Arb.






NOTE:  This table was compiled using the following sources: American Arbitration Association,
Health Care Claim Settlement Procedures (brochure offered to AAA users)(7/92); Kaiser’s “Arbitration
of Claims;” (memorandum of rules furnished to enrollees) (3/97); and CAP/MPT’s standard form
Physician-Patient Arbitration Agreement.
*AAA rules are drafted for nationwide application and do not specify governing law.  It is likely
that any contract drafted in California that specifies submission of a dispute to AAA will also include a
clause specifying that the dispute will be resolved under California law.
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The agreements of CAP/MPT and Kaiser differ from the AAA rules in
several important respects.  AAA sets a lower dollar threshold for using three
arbitrators, and all arbitrators are neutral and chosen from a AAA-compiled
list of candidates.  These provisions contrast sharply with the Kaiser-CAP/MPT
model of two-party arbitrators and one neutral arbitrator chosen at large.
Although each set of rules provides time limits for selecting arbitrators, AAA’s
schedule is considerably faster, and there is no requirement of due diligence on
the part of the plaintiff.  AAA rules require a brief statement of findings and
conclusions with the award.  In terms of costs, CAP/MPT and Kaiser disputants
pay a filing fee and their respective shares of the neutral arbitrator and other
costs, while AAA disputants split all costs including costs for administrative
services and facilities.  Most notably, Kaiser and CAP/MPT rules are self-
administering, as described above, while the AAA rules ascribe to the
Association an active roll in administration and oversight and make provisions
for expediting disputes despite the noncompliance of a party.
Although this study does not examine implementation practices in detail,
there is some evidence that, at least in some respects, arbitration rules and
agreements are more often honored in the breach.  For example, there is ample
evidence that dispute processing often experiences delays far exceeding time
limits specified in the rules.130
Regarding enforcement of the agreement, CAP/MPT and Kaiser both
report assiduously enforcing contractual agreements to arbitrate; if there is an
agreement, they compel arbitration.  CAP/MPT reports that even if its insured
has no agreement in force, it will search for other agreements (for example an
agreement between the claimant and a hospital co-defendant) that they might
use to compel arbitration of the claim.
At the same time, almost two-thirds of the physicians who report using
agreements also say that if a patient refuses to sign one, they nonetheless
provide treatment.  This finding probably reflects the discomfort physicians
experience when beginning the doctor-patient relationship with discussions of
disputing.  But, as Table 7 shows,  CAP/MPT’s physicians are significantly less
likely than other physicians to ignore noncompliance.131
                                                          
130. Both Kaiser and CIGNA reported in the CAHMO Survey that the average annual time to
disposition for an arbitrated medical malpractice case was between 2.5 and 3.5 years.  More recently,
evidence presented in Engalla documented that, despite Kaiser’s rules, the average time to
appointment of the neutral arbitrator in Kaiser disputes was 674 days.  938 P.2d at 913.
131. Responses of “unaware of their decision” and “informed but proceed to treat with no
comment” are classified together as “no action.”
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TABLE 7










CAP/MPT 50% 31%   19% 16
Other Insurers 72% 11%   17% 18
NOTE:  Table reports only survey respondents.
IV
CONCLUSIONS
Our research does not permit us to draw any evaluative conclusions
regarding outcomes when binding arbitration agreements are in place.132  Our
survey results are inconclusive as to whether agreements lead to faster, less
expensive, and/or more satisfying results or whether arbitrators show any biases
toward defendants or plaintiffs.  However, certain observations can be made
regarding the diffusion of arbitration agreements and the resulting challenges
faced by public and private policymakers.
This study suggests several conclusions of particular note:
(1)  Few disputes are on the arbitration track.  Our examination of
agreements in California determined that the private, binding arbitration of
health care disputes is not commonplace.  Contrary to common perceptions,
the prevalence of agreements between health plans/providers and
enrollees/patients is surprisingly low.  Although most HMOs have
agreements with their enrollees, these agreements apply only to coverage
disputes, which are remarkably rare.
(2)  Although prevalence of arbitration agreements is low, their diffusion
and application is dynamic.  Our survey evidence strongly suggests a
dynamic innovation environment.  Organizations that are well positioned to
stimulate use of agreements are aware of them and alert to information that
may demonstrate they have value.  Statutory and case law trends suggest
that managed care organizations, especially HMOs, will be forced to
assume increasing responsibility for the quality of care delivered under their
auspices.  Thus, agreements already in use by health plans will cover a
broader array of disputes.
                                                          
132. See Appendix for a discussion of the obstacles to conducting a valid empirical evaluation of
the results of binding arbitration agreements in California.
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(3)  A major obstacle to more rapid diffusion of agreements appears to be
physician opposition.  In addition to determining whether to use
agreements in their own practices, physicians, for the most part, control the
policies of the major medical malpractice insurers.  Physicians’ perceptions
that agreements “set the wrong tone” in patient relations translates into
organizational policies.  As insurance companies go public and expand their
management beyond the physician community, attitudes and policies may
change.
(4)  Organizational policies drive use of agreements.  This study documents
the centrality of organizational policy in the diffusion process.  Arbitration
agreements are in use where medical malpractice insurers and managed
care plans have proactive policies in place to support them.  Absent those
policies, agreements are not in use.
These conclusions have some important implications for both public and
private policymakers.  Given the current dynamic state of diffusion, small
changes may have large effects on the prevalence of agreements.  For example,
better information regarding the benefits of arbitration is likely to have major
effects on use.  If it becomes possible to conduct a sound empirical evaluation,
and that evaluation documents substantial efficiency gains with arbitration,
organizations seem positioned to move rapidly toward adoption.  Conversely, if
the evidence suggests little in the way of benefit, diffusion is likely to stall.
Similarly, if responsibility for quality of care continues to shift toward managed
care organizations, we are likely to see rapid growth in arbitrated caseloads.
The potential for rapid change, in turn, suggests that public policymakers
need to evaluate seriously the need for additional regulation of the private
arbitration process.  Should arbitration agreements be further regulated, given
that they are private contractual agreements?  If so, in what ways should they
be managed?  Creating well-targeted public regulation will require sound
evidence regarding the effect of these agreements on procedural equity and the
interests and concerns of all the parties.
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APPENDIX
OBSTACLES TO AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF BINDING ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS
One purpose of the study reported here was to investigate the feasibility of
a  carefully designed empirical evaluation of the use of binding arbitration
agreements in the health care industry in California.  Specifically, the goal of
the empirical evaluation would be to compare the results of handling health
care disputes when binding arbitration agreements are in place and when they
are not.  The question: All other factors being equal, are disputes concluded
more quickly, and with lower costs, more satisfying results to participants,
higher payments, and/or more plaintiff “wins” with or without binding
arbitration agreements?  Our information gathering activities in the present
study were designed in part to ascertain whether the necessary ingredients for a
valid evaluation are present.  As explained below, we conclude that they are
not.
A.    Comparing Disputes With and Without Binding Arbitration Agreements
Disputes of interest in this context are medical malpractice claims and
coverage disputes.  However, as discussed in the text, there are too few
coverage disputes to support a valid empirical evaluation.  Thus, any empirical
evaluation must be limited to the handling of medical malpractice claims.
Any actual claim is processed either with or without a binding arbitration
agreement in place, making it impossible to compare the two methods on the
same claim. Thus for a valid evaluation, we must compare the results (cost,
payouts, time to disposition, etc.) of handling similar types of claims in similar
legal environments, where the only significant difference is whether claims
handling was governed by a binding arbitration agreement or not.
There are two conceptual approaches to evaluating the effects of binding
arbitration agreements:
(1)  A “before” and “after” comparison of populations of similar types of
claims brought in the context of a single organization that has introduced
the widespread use of arbitration agreements; or
(2)  A side-by-side comparison of similar types of claims arising in two
similar environments, one of which uses arbitration agreements and one of
which does not.
B.    Possible Environments for Evaluating the Effects of Binding Arbitration
Agreements
To evaluate the effects of arbitration agreements effectively, it is necessary
to identify claiming environments with enough similarity to be credibly
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comparable in all dimensions that are likely to influence the outcomes of
interest except the presence or absence of arbitration agreements.  There are
three possible claiming environments in California that might provide
comparison data on malpractice claims: (1) physician malpractice insurers; (2)
hospital malpractice risk bearers (insurers, hospitals, etc.); and (3) staff or
group model HMOs.
1.  Physician Malpractice Insurers.  Physician malpractice insurers are not a
promising focus.  CAP/MPT is the only physician malpractice insurer in
California that uses binding arbitration agreements to any appreciable degree.
However, because it has promoted binding arbitration agreements among its
insureds for more than ten years, it would not be possible to construct a
credible “before” and “after” comparison.  Even if it were possible to obtain
data for the “before” and “after” caseloads, the claiming environments of the
two periods are too different to permit credible comparisons.  The other
possibility—comparing the treatment sample of CAP/MPT cases with a control
sample from other insurers—is equally problematic, because use of binding
arbitration agreements appears to be specialty dependent.  CAP/MPT reports,
for example, that its pathologists and anesthesiologists do not use agreements,
while its high risk surgical specialties do.  Therefore, any comparison groups
would be restricted to claims from those specialties using agreements and
would be so limited in size that the study’s conclusions would be severely
restricted.  Moreover, a design that depends on data from malpractice carriers
is risky, given the reluctance of carriers to share such sensitive data and the
poor definitional comparability among carriers of case information.
2.  Hospitals.  Problems in constructing a valid evaluation of the effects of
arbitration agreements used by hospitals are even greater than in evaluating
those used by physicians.  As reported in the text, only two responding
hospitals reported use of binding arbitration agreements, reflecting a
population of hospitals using arbitration agreements that is too small to support
a “before” and “after” comparison.  Constructing a contemporaneous
comparison is equally problematic. Hospitals use varying mixes of self
insurance, third-party claims administration, and malpractice insurance to deal
with liability.  Building comparable treatment (those using arbitration
agreements) and control groups (those with no arbitration agreements) would
require careful matching of hospitals on a host of dimensions, including level
and type of insurance, claims administration, implementation of arbitration
agreements, and type of hospital, to name only the most obvious
characteristics.  Since only a small percentage of hospitals actually use
agreements, the achievable sample size is again too small to support statistically
valid comparisons.
3.  HMOs.  The potential for constructing an evaluation based on the
experience of HMOs is no more promising.  Kaiser Permanente is the only
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HMO that uses arbitration agreements with a sufficiently large caseload to
support any role in an evaluation.  However, a valid “before” and “after”
design is not feasible in this case, because Kaiser introduced arbitration
agreements in the mid-1970s, too long ago to support a “before/after” design.
Alternatively one might hope to compare the experience of Kaiser and
CIGNA until 1996 (when CIGNA stopped covering malpractice liability), using
a number of smaller group/staff model HMOs as the control (non-treatment)
group.  This strategy is impractical for two reasons.  First, Kaiser Permanente
dominates the arbitration caseload.  At the same time, it is arguably a unique
organization,  so structurally and culturally distinct that any differences in
claiming outcomes could well be attributed to organizational differences rather
than the presence of arbitration agreements.  Second, the numbers of
disputes—especially among HMOs in the control group—are too small to
support a useful comparison.
The above analysis leads us to conclude that mounting a valid empirical
evaluation of the effects of arbitration agreements in today’s health care arena
is not feasible.  On the other hand, careful case studies of the adoption and
implementation of binding arbitration agreements may produce useful insights
into the problems and the benefits of this method of dispute handling.
